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Abstract
Wireless LANs are growing rapidly and security has
always been a concern. We have implemented a hybrid
system, which will not only detect active attacks like
identity theft causing denial of service attacks, but will also
detect the usage of accesspoint discovery tools. The system
responds in real time by sending out an alert to the
network administrator.

1. Introduction
WIRELESS LANs using the IEEE 802.11 protocols are
being deployed widely. With this increasing popularity in
Wi-Fi, security has become a major concern. Until now
WLANs have encountered threats such as unauthorized
access to network resources, installation of rogue access
points and illegal sniffing [1]. We refer to these as
classical security threats. Today in addition, active and
advanced attacks like MAC spoofing or Denial of Service
attacks are more prevalent. Wardriving also pose a major
security risk. [2].

1.1. Our Contribution
We have designed and implemented (DH-ABIDERS),
which is a combination of Signature and Anomaly based
Intrusion Detection System (following the classification in
[3] for wired networks). DH-ABIDERS stands for
Distributed Hybrid Agent Based Intrusion DEtection and
Real time Response System. To summarize, we have
designed and implemented a system, which uses
1. Anomaly Based Model to detect identity theft
2. Signature Based Model to detect wardriving.
3. LanScan - monitor wireless LAN and to detect
installation of Rogue Access Points.

provides solutions for intrusion prevention by using an
anomaly detection system. These tools are not
comprehensive enough to detect wardriving, identity theft
and installation of network misconfigurations. There is a
similar ongoing work being carried out by researchers at
the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities [6]. Like DHABIDERS, Ajanta uses the “Sequence Number Analysis”
technique to detect MAC layer spoofing attacks. We unlike
Ajanta, extend this technique to ICMP augmentation to
Sequence Number Analysis, for decreasing the number of
false positives.

3. Design and Implementation
3.1. Architecture
Consider a cell, which can be thought as an area where
one WLAN is deployed. Each cell also has a centralized
agent. This agent is responsible for:
1. Data collection - Scanning of the cell activity.
2. First level data analysis.
3. Updating information with central administrator.
All these cells come under a central administrator. It is
responsible for:
1. Interpreting data passed by cell agents.
2. Second level data analysis
3. A response system if intrusion is detected.
Figure 1 shows agents and the central administrator.

2. Related Work
Figure 1. Cells, Agents, Central Administrator.
AirTraf (Now Elixar) [4], AirDefense [5] are examples
of software solutions for 802.11 security threats. AirTraf is
used to discover problems in the WLAN. AirDefense
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3.2. 802.11 Attacks
As shown in Figure 2, we have broadly classified
wireless attacks as Active and Passive attacks. Installation
of network misconfigurations like rogue access points
cannot be classified into passive or active attacks. Identity
theft (impersonification) attacks are further classified
according to the techniques used: Packet insertion
technique and application layer techniques. Passive attacks
can be classified into illegal sniffing and wardriving.
Wardriving is discussed in section 3.6.

false positives generated by this technique as described in
Section 3.5. The 802.11 standard has set aside 2 bytes for
sequence control. 802.11 frames have a 12-bit sequence
number and a 4-bit fragment number in the sequence
control field. We can use this sequence number to detect
such attacks. The frame structure of 802.11 is as shown in
Figure 3. The sequence number is a 12- bit number and is
generated by the firmware of the NIC card. The sender
NIC, increments the sequence number, with every frame it
places on the physical layer.

Figure 3. IEEE 802.11 frame structure.

Figure 2. Classification of attacks dealt with.

3.3. Intrusion Approaches
Many WLANs today rely on MAC address as an
authentication entity. While this provides a low level of
security, there are many security breaches.
Our first approach is based on impersonification of
MAC address. An attacker can modify the manufacturer
assigned MAC address of the wireless card on the fly and
thus the identity of any user.
A second approach is based on the fact that 802.11
management frames are neither encrypted nor
authenticated. Using open source libraries like AirJack or
Radiate, attackers can inject malicious 802.11 frames in
the network.
Libnet [7] is widely used as a packet insertion library for
wired networks. However it does not provide an interface
to inject 802.11 frames. Radiate provides 802.11-frame
creation and injection APIs. They are based on HostAP [8]
drivers. HostAP is driver for Intersil's Prism2/2.5/3[9]
chipset wireless LAN cards.
We used Radiate library for injecting malicious frames
in the network. After installing and configuring the
wireless card with HostAP, we wrote a program to
impersonify the identity of the access point of the network
and then continuously inject disassociation frames. As an
effect of this attack, all the other clients connected to the
access point got continuously kicked off from the network.

Consider an attacker spoof his wireless NIC card using
the techniques described in section 3.3. During this time,
the legitimate user is unaware of the attackers intentions.
Thus at any given point during the attack, the DHABIDERS agent will discover 802.11 frames which seem
to have same MAC address and IP address; the addresses
of the attacker and the legitimate user; however the order
of sequence numbers would be notably different.
Moreover attacker does not have facility to change any
sequence numbers on the fly because no NIC driver can
handle sequence number functionality. Reason why NIC
driver cannot handle this functionality is that, the
fragmentation of frames is carried out by the NIC
firmware. Fragments of the same frame need their
sequence numbers to remain the same. Thus the NIC
firmware will allocate sequence numbers according to the
MTU of the physical link and the frame length.

3.5. ICMP Augmentation to Sequence Number
Analysis
Intrusion Detection systems should minimize the
number of false positives. To reduce these false positives
generated, we propose an interesting extension called
“ICMP Augmentation.” It is based on the principle that,
when an attacker tries to steal the identity of a legitimate
user, by spoofing his/her MAC address, the attacker will
certainly obtain the IP address of the legitimate user. Thus
for a single IP address, there would be two NICs
responding and thus can conclude malicious spoofing.

3.6. Detection of AP Discovery Tools
3.4. Detection Approach
We use MAC Layer Sequence Number Analysis
Technique [10] to detect the above-described active
attacks. We also improve on this to minimize number of

Wireless LAN discovery tools such as NetStumbler are
designed to identify network characteristics. Wardriving
takes advantage of 802.11 standards being open. The
802.11 framework has described active probing method,
which uses probe request frames to detect wireless activity.
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Our system detects the usage of AP Discovery tools like
NetStumbler. Upon detecting the use of such a tool, the
system sends an email to the system administrator and
saves the packet log as evidence. A unique signature
pattern of NetStumbler frame as described in [11] is used
to detect this.

3.7. Summing up
As shown in Figure 4, agent has two modules-The
sniffing module and the Parsing and Detection module.
The sniffing module spawns as many agent threads as the
number of clients, each representing a sniffer for every
client of the WLAN.
Figure 5. Models in DH-ABIDERS.

4. References

Figure 4. Process model of agent in DHABIDERS.
Parsing and Detection module:
1. Parses the verbose output of the sniffing module
2. Implements Anomaly based analysis model to detect
identity theft and DOS attacks.
3. Implements Signature analysis model to detect
wardriving.
4. Submits the anomaly-based analysis results to the
central administrator to perform a second level
analysis – ICMP Augmentation.
We have thus developed a Hybrid Real Time Agent
Based Intrusion Detection and Response System to
increase the security in wireless networks. The system is
implemented and tested successfully. The system utilizes
open source solutions, thus minimizing deployment and
maintenance costs to a large extent
Figure 5 shows how the two models are used to detect
the attacks, classified in Figure 2.
An interesting extension can be the integration of
honeypots [12] with DH-ABIDERS. A significant
improvement, is to integrate the current system with a
more robust anomaly detection engine, which can analyze
the captured data for signs of intrusions, using techniques
such as data mining and statistical approaches for Intrusion
Detection. Work has been done in [13] related to this.
Detailed information about this work is available in
[14].
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